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For civil rights lawyers who had toiled through the 1980s in the increasingly
barren fields of race and sex discrimination law, the charmed passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act through the U.S. House and Senate and across a
Republican President's desk must have seemed vaguely surreal. The strongly
bipartisan House vote in the Summer of 1990 was a remarkable 377 to 28, the vote
in the Senate an equally overwhelming 91 to 6.1 Rising to speak in favor of the bill,
Republican co-sponsor Orrin Hatch-not known for impassioned endorsements of
new civil rights protections-cried on the Senate floor.2 Senator Tom Harkin, who
had earlier delivered his floor remarks in American Sign Language, said of the bill
following the Senate vote, "It will change the way we live forever."3
Signing the bill into law, President Bush was equally effusive. Describing the
nation's historical treatment of the disabled as comprising a "shameful wall of
exclusion," President Bush compared passage of the ADA to the destruction of the
Berlin Wall:
Now I am signing legislation that takes a sledgehammer to another wall, one that has
for too many generations separated Americans with disabilities from the freedom
they could glimpse but not grasp. And once again we rejoice as this barrier falls,
proclaiming together we will not accept, we will not excuse, we will not tolerate
discrimination in America... Let the shameful wall of exclusion finally come
tumbling down. '
t Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall); A.B. Stanford
University, 1975; J.D. New York University School of Law, 1978. This Symposium represents the Herculean efforts
of a truly remarkable group of people, including the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 staffs of the Berkeley Journal of
Employment and Labor Law, the Symposium's presenters and commenters, and the many lawyers and disability
community activists who attended the Symposium meetings and contributed so much to the work ultimately collected
here. My own special appreciation extends to Vicki Laden, who four years ago suggested the need for an investigation
such as this, and whose insight, encouragement, and support made its realization possible.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990); see also FRED PELKA, THE ABC-CLIO COMPANION TO THE
DisABILrry RIGHTS MOVEMENT 20 (1997).
2. Elaine S. Povich, Senate OK's Bill Fixing Rights of the Disabled, Cm. 'flIB., July 14, 1990, at 1.
3. Bush Eager to Sign Bill Opening Doors for 43 Million Disabled, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., July 14, at A l.
4. Knocking Down a Barrier, NEWSDAY (Nassau and Suffolk Edition), July 27, 1990, at 7.
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At the July 27"' signing ceremony, held on the White House South Lawn to
accommodate the large crowd of activists in attendance, President Bush cavalierly
dismissed predictions that the law would prove too costly or loose an avalanche of
lawsuits.' Republican Senator Bob Dole, a strong ADA supporter, admitted that
the new law would place "some burden" on business, but found that burden
justified because the Act would "make it much easier" for America's disabled.
6
For traditional civil rights lawyers, this was incongruous fare. For the
previous two months, Senators Dole and Hatch, along with Vice President Quayle,
President Bush, and others in his administration, had been sharply denouncing the
Civil Rights Act of 1990,' pejoratively labeling it a "quota bill."8 The soon to be
vetoed legislation, which in much-diluted form eventually became the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 9 sought to countermand a series of Supreme Court cases that, among
other things, had virtually erased disparate impact theory, '0 an accepted feature of
Title VII jurisprudence since the early 1970s. The veto, which the Senate failed to
override by one vote, represented a dispiriting defeat for traditional civil rights
constituencies and their lawyers.
The Civil Rights Act of 1990 was not the only employment rights casualty of
President Bush's veto power. Just a year before he signed the ADA into law," the
President had vetoed a bill that would have raised the minimum wage from $3.35
an hour to $4.55. Stunning the Congressional leadership, the veto came a mere 51
minutes after the bill had reached the President's desk. On June 29, 1990, only two
days after the ADA's festive South Lawn signing ceremony, President Bush vetoed
the Family and Medical Leave Act, which would have required covered employers
to accommodate workers by providing up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave in cases of
family illness or childbirth. In defense of the veto, Bush stated that such practices
should not be mandated by the government, but should rather be "crafted at the
workplace by employers and employees."' 2 Neither the minimum wage hike nor
5. President Bush was quoted in the Boston Globe as stating, "We've all been determined to ensure that it
gives flexibility, particularly in terms of the timetable of implementation, and we've been committed to containing the
costs that may be incurred." John W. Mashek, To Cheers, Bush Signs Rights Law for Disabled, BOSTON GLOBE, July
27, 1990, at 4.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S 10287-01 (statement of Senator Metzenbaum, citing A Red Herring in Black
and White, N.Y. TIES, July 23, 1990, at 14); 136 Cong. Rec. S9809, S9814; 136 Cong. Rec. S10321.
8. On July 19, 1990, Vice President Dan Quayle said of the Act, "the Administration is not going to have a
quota bill crammed down its throat disguised as a civil rights bill." Steven A. Holmes, Accord is Sought on Rights
Measure to Avert a Veto, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at Al. Quayle's comments followed upon those of White House
Chief of Staff, John Sununu, who on July 17th, stated, "The bill, as crafted right now, is a quota bill..." Steve Gerstel,
Senate Limits Debate on Civil Rights Bill; Veto Threatened, UNTED PRESS INT'L, July 17, 1990. Senator Hatch
referred to the bill as "terrible," even "heinous," and predicted that it would "create a litigation bonanza." Concluded
Hatch in one interview, "[e]ven a cursory review reveals that (the bill) is simply and unalterably a quota bill." In his
veto statement, delivered on October 20, 1990, President Bush justified his action by stating, "I will not sign a quota
bill." Id. George Archibald, Special Report: The Bush Record, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1992, at A8.
9. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
10. The disparate impact case was Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
11. President Bush vetoed the minimum wage bill on June 13, 1989. See 135 CONG. REC. H2498-03 (1989).
12. See 136 CoNG. REC. H24451-02 (1990).
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the FMLA, which Bush vetoed again in 1992, would become law until passed by
the next Congress and signed into law in 1993 by newly inaugurated President
William Jefferson Clinton.
It must have been difficult for traditional civil rights lawyers, reeling from
these many setbacks, to comprehend the triumphal enthusiasm with which
Republican senators and administration officials celebrated the passage of the
ADA. How could such a transformative statute, requiring not only formal equality,
as the non-discrimination concept had traditionally been understood, but also
structural equality-the accommodation of difference-have passed by such
lopsided margins? How could it have garnered so much support from Republicans
in the House and Senate, or from a Republican President who had in other contexts
so vigorously resisted the expansion of civil rights protections? How could the
President and the Republican Congressional leadership embrace the disparate
impact provisions of the ADA so readily, while at the same time sharply decrying
them in the doomed Civil Rights Act of 1990?
There was incredulity in the traditional civil rights community, but there was
also hope-hope not only that the ADA would transform the lives of disabled
Americans, but also that the theoretical breakthrough represented by reasonable
accommodation theory would eventually play a role in solving other equality
problems, which the more broadly accepted equal treatment principle had proven
inadequate to address.
The Americans with Disabilities Act and the administrative regulations that
followed it seemed to hold enormous practical and theoretical potential. The Act's
definition of disability had been drawn broadly, to cover not only the "traditional
disabled," such as individuals who were blind, or deaf, or used wheelchairs, but
also people who had stigmatizing medical conditions such as diabetes, epilepsy, or
morbid obesity. It covered not only people who were actually disabled, but those
who had a record of a disability, such as cancer survivors, whom employers might
be unwilling to hire for fear of increased medical insurance costs or future
incapacity. The statute also covered people who were not and had not been
disabled, but were simply perceived as such, like people with asymptomatic HIV or
a genetic predisposition towards a particular illness. It covered not only physical
disabilities, but mental disabilities as well, arguably the most stigmatizing medical
conditions in American society.
The ADA incorporated a profoundly different model of equality from that
associated with traditional non-discrimination statutes like Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.3 Those statutes, for the most part,14 were geared toward
achieving only formal equality: equal treatment of similarly situated individuals.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (as amended).
14. Title Vll's disparate impact theory does represent a structural model of equality. However, that theory can
be applied only in very narrow circumstances. For a discussion of this issue, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity. 47 STAN. L.
REv. 1161, 1162 n. 3 (1995).
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As numerous legal scholars had observed, the equal treatment principle had not
proven tremendously effective in addressing problems of equality and difference."
The ADA required not only that disabled individuals be treated no worse than non-
disabled individuals with whom they were similarly situated, but also directed that
in certain contexts they be treated differently, arguably better, to achieve an equal
effect. 
16
In this regard, the statute and its implementing regulations required covered
employers to do something that no federal employment rights statute had ever done
before: it required them to engage with a disabled employee or applicant in a good
faith interactive process to find ways to accommodate the employee's disability and
enable him to work. 17 This "duty to bargain in good faith" represented a dramatic
shift in the ordinary power relationship between employers and employees on such
issues as shift assignments, hours of work, physical plant, or the division of job
duties among employees. At least in the non-union context, these had previously
been aspects of the employer-employee relationship over which employers
exercised exclusive control, subject of course to the basic non-discrimination
principle that no applicant or employee could be treated less favorably for a reason
specifically proscribed by law.
When enacted in the Summer of 1990, the ADA was the only employment-
related federal civil rights statute that centrally featured a structural theory of
equality. Title VII's disparate impact theory, which had been under attack
throughout the 1980s, had been all but obliterated by the Supreme Court's decision
in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,19 and by the President's veto of the Civil
Rights Act of 1990. Other Supreme Court cases had years before either strongly
implied or explicitly precluded the assertion of disparate impact claims in Title VII
pay equity cases,' 9 or in cases seeking to enforce constitutionally-based protections
15. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW
(1990); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1987) (exploring problems of
gender equality and difference); Linda J. Krieger & Patricia Cooney, The Miller Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment,
Positive Action, and the Meaning of Women's Equality, in D. KELLY WEISBERG, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:
FOUNDATIONS 156 (1993).
16. The term "discriminate," which was not defined at all in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is defined in a highly
detailed and multi-faceted way in Section 102 of the ADA. With respect to reasonable accommodation, Section 102
provides that the term "discriminate" includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The meaning of "undue hardship" is defined in the
statutes implementing regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p).
17. The "interactive process duty" is described at 29 C.F.R. § 1630(o)(3). This section provides:
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to
initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the
accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and
potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.
18. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
19. Although the issue was not directly before it, the Supreme Court in Washington County v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161, 170 (1981), opined that Title VII's Bennett Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), which incorporated into the
statute the affirmative defenses contained in the Equal Pay Act of 1963, would in all likelihood preclude the use of
disparate impact theory in Title VI pay equity cases. This has been, and continues to be, the approach taken in a
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against race, sex, or national origin discrimination.20 And, in Trans World Airlines,
21Inc. v. Hardison, the Court had so severely limited Title Vii's religious
accommodation principle as to render it virtually useless.
The ADA's embrace of structural equality seemed clear and unambiguous.
Qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection devices having an
unjustified disparate impact on disabled applicants or employees were clearly
defined as discriminatory, 22  as were standards, criteria, or methods of
administration that had discriminatory effects.2 ' The non-discrimination principle
unambiguously included a duty of reasonable accommodation, with which
employers were required to comply even if the accommodation lowered an
employee's marginal productivity, so long as the expense incurred did not rise to
the level of "undue hardship. ' ' 4
The ADA and its implementing regulations had yet another remarkable
feature: they limited an employer's prerogative to exclude a disabled person from a
particular job based on a scientifically unsound assessment of the risks to health
and safety posed by the person's disability. Under the new law, an employer could
exclude a disabled individual from a particular job on safety grounds only if the
person presented a "direct threat"" to the health or safety of others in the
workplace, as that term had been narrowly interpreted under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.26 Specifically, under the direct threat defense an employer could exclude a
disabled individual from a particular job only upon a "reasonable medical judgment
that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available
objective evidence," taking into account the duration of the alleged risk, the nature
and severity of the potential harm, and the imminence and actual likelihood of
21potential harm.
Because stigmatizing conditions are so often associated with irrational
perceptions of danger,28 and because risk assessment in any context is more often
majority of the circuits. See, e.g., Auto Workers v. Michigan, 886 F.2d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1989); State, County, &
Municipal Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985).
20. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that disparate impact theory is unavailable in cases
asserting rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
21. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
22. 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(6) (1994).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (1994).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (1994). The meaning of "undue hardship" is spelled out in the ADA's





25. The direct threat defense is found in Section 103 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
26. Section 501 of the ADA provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, nothing in this Act shall be
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29
U.S.C. 790 et. seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title." The direct threat defense had
been defined for Section 504 purposes in terms virtually identical to those incorporated into the ADA Regulations in
School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
28. In connection with this aspect of stigma, see generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTTrY (1963). This point is developed later in this volume by Vicki Laden and Greg
Schwartz in Psychiatric Disabilities, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the New Workplace Violence Account, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 246 (2000).
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based on popular myths and stereotypes than on sound scientific analysis,29 the
ADA's direct threat defense was potentially transformative. No longer, it seemed,
could a disabled person be excluded from a particular job because his or her
presence was in good faith viewed as presenting an elevated health or safety risk.
In making any such assessment, the ADA seemed to require that an employer
replace an "intuitive" or "popular" approach to risk assessment with more scientific
methods and standards.
In short, the Americans with Disabilities Act appeared to be a "second
generation 30  civil rights statute, advancing both formal and structural models of
equality by imposing a duty of accommodation as well as a duty of formal non-
discrimination, regulating health and safety risk analysis in situations involving
disabled employees or applicants, and extending these protections to an apparently
wide class-a class ranging far beyond those traditionally viewed as "disabled" in
legal and popular culture. Supporters hailed it as a triumph of a new "civil rights"
or "social" model of disability over an older and outmoded "impairment" or
"public benefits" model. 31 The ADA promised to revive the concept of stigma as a
powerful hermeneutic for the elaboration and judicial application of American civil
rights law. 2 Supporters and detractors alike predicted that the structural approach
to equality advanced by the ADA might eventually diffuse into other areas of the
law, eroding the entrenched understanding that equality always-and only-
requires equal treatment under rules and practices assumed to be neutral.
The employment discrimination provisions of the ADA were gradually phased
in between 1990 and 1994. Although passed in 1990, the Act did not become
effective until 1992,"3 at which point Title I, which prohibits discrimination in
employment, covered employers with 25 or more employees. 4 In 1994, coverage
was extended to employers with 15 or more employees.35 Within the disability
29. For an interesting exploration of this phenomenon and its broader implications for governmental risk
regulation, see Timur Kuran & Cass Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683 (1999)
(describing the threats to rational regulatory activity posed by popular dynamics of risk perception).
30. 1 borrow here from Robert Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413 (1991).
31. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal
Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, 1357-58 (1993); Richard K. Scotch
& Kay Schriner, Disability, Civil Rights, and Public Policy: The Politics of Implementation, 22 J. POL'Y STUD. 170
(1994). For a thorough treatment of the development of the civil rights and social models of disability within the
disability rights movement, see RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIvIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL
DISABLIrrY POLICY (1984) (focusing on events connected with the passage and implementation of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973). In this volume, see Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or
Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213 (2000).
32. See, e.g., Drinuner, supra note 31, at 1349-51 (discussing the concept of stigma in relation to disability
rights law and policy); see generally Harlan Hahn, The Appearance of Physical Difference: A New Agenda for Political
Research, J. HEALTH & HUM. RESOURCES ADMIN. 391 (1991) (discussing stigma and other aspects of the attitudinal
environment in relation to the concept of discrimination).
33. Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. 1, at 108, 104 Stat. 337 (1990) ("This Title [42 U.S.C.S. §§ 12111-12117] shall
become effective 24 months after the date of enactment.").
34. 42U.S.C.§ 12111(5) (1994).
35. Id.
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activist community, expectations for the statute ran high. Within the employer
community, so did concerns. Across the country, large law firms began running
training sessions for their employer clients and strategy development workshops for
employment defense lawyers, who would soon busy themselves preventing and
defending cases brought under the new law.36
As judicial opinions in Title I cases began to accumulate, it became clear that
the Act was not being interpreted as its drafters and supporters within the disability
rights movement had planned. Indeed, by 1996 many in the disability community
were speaking of an emerging judicial backlash against the ADA. Law review
articles written by many of the statute's drafters described a powerful narrowing
trend in the federal judiciary, especially on the foundational question of who was a
"person with a disability" entitled to protection under the Act. These articles,
which told a consistent and to disability activists troubling story, bore titles like:
The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act
37
"Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special
Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability;3
Restoring Regard for the Regarded As Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional
Intent.3"
Of course, one might have discounted these alarmist accounts on the grounds
that partisans on one or another side of a disputed social issue often over-estimate
the strength of a hostile trend. But systematic studies of ADA Title I cases
published in 1998 and 1999 eventually lent empirical support to what ADA
advocates were reporting. The overwhelming majority of ADA employment
discrimination plaintiffs were losing their cases, and the federal judiciary was
interpreting the law in consistently narrowing ways.
A study of federal district court decisions conducted by the American Bar
Association reported in 1998 that, in a data set including all published ADA Title I
cases that had gone to judgment either before or after trial, plaintiffs lost ninety-two
percent of the time.4° In the Fifth Circuit, the figure was a startling ninety-five
41
Less than a year later, Ohio State law professor Ruth Colker published an
even more comprehensive and arguably better-designed study of outcomes in
36. For further discussion of these developments, see in this volume, Chai Feldblum, The Definition of
Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2000).
37. Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 COLO. L. REV. 107 (1997).
38. Robert Burgdorf, "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment
Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409 (1997).
39. Arlene Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent,
42 VILL. L. REv. 587 (1997).
40. American Bar Ass'n Comm'n. on Mental & Physical Disability, Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA
Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403.
41. Id.
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federal district and appellate ADA Title I decisions.42 Professor Colker's two-part
data set included not only the cases analyzed in the American Bar Association
study, but also published and unpublished federal circuit court decisions available
through Westlaw or other electronic reporting services.43 Before analyzing these
data, Professor Colker excluded cases that could readily be identified as
"frivolous," including cases filed against a non-covered entity, cases challenging
conduct that occurred before the Act's effective date, and cases otherwise asserting
claims that could not possibly be covered by the ADA.44
Colker's results reinforced the American Bar Association findings. With
respect to cases included in the appeals court data set, defendants had prevailed at
the trial court level 94% of the time. As to that 94%, where plaintiffs were
appealing an adverse district court judgment, defendants prevailed on appeal 84%
of the time. 5 Of the 6% of district court cases in which plaintiffs had prevailed in
the district court, almost half, or 48%, were reversed in defendants' favor on
appeal. 46 Colker's re-analysis of the ABA data set largely confirmed the studies'
original conclusions; she found that defendants had prevailed 92.7% of the time.47
Colker's content analysis of courts' opinions in these cases proved equally
unsettling for disability rights advocates. Closely reviewing the decisions
contained in the district and appellate court data sets, she demonstrated that courts
were systematically deploying two strategies in ruling against plaintiffs. First,
district courts were granting and appellate courts were confirming summary
judgments against plaintiffs even in situations where material issues of fact were
clearly present, thereby keeping cases from proceeding to jury trial.48  Second,
Colker showed, in construing the ADA's many ambiguous provisions, courts were
consistently refusing to follow either the Act's extensive legislative history or the
administrative regulations and other interpretive guidance issued by the EEOC.49
Of course, one might explain these otherwise alarming statistics by positing an
adverse selection effect, caused by the more meritorious cases being resolved
before a judicial complaint is filed. But as Steven Percy's paper later in this
volume suggests," one finds little support for this view in statistics maintained by
the EEOC.
42. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
99(1999).
43. Id. at 103.
44. Id. at 106 n. 39.
45. Id. at 108.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 109. For a variety of reasons, these results probably over-estimate plaintiffs' rates of success. While
a discussion of these reasons is beyond the scope of this paper, interested readers are referred to Colker's discussion at
pp. 104-105 and 108-109. Her reasoning in this regard parallels earlier observations in Peter Siegelman & John J.
Donohue 111, Studying the Iceberg from its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment
Discrimination Cases, 24 L. & SoC'Y REV. 1133 (1990).
48. Colker, supra note 42, at 101.
49. Id. at 102.
50. Stephen Percy, Administrative Remedies and Legal Disputes: Evidence on Key Controversies Underlying
Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 412 (2000).
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Between 1992 and 1998, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
resolved a total of 106,988 charges of discrimination under the ADA. Of these,
only 4,027, or 3.8%, resulted in reasonable cause determinations, and only 14,729,
or 13.8%, resulted in "merit resolutions" of any kind, including settlements,
withdrawals with benefits, or determinations of reasonable cause." The largest
category of administrative dispositions consisted of "no cause" determinations,
which accounted for 51.4% of all dispositions, followed by "administrative
closures," at 34.9%, many of which result from a charging party obtaining a right to
sue and commencing his or her own legal action before the EEOC has completed
its investigation.52 Although more detailed study and analysis would certainly aid
our understanding of how ADA cases proceed from initial dispute to litigation,
there is little in the EEOC data to support the theory that a disproportionate share of
non-meritorious cases are reaching the federal courts.
Oddly, during the years in which the cases analyzed in the Colker and ABA
studies were accumulating, one could never have gleaned from popular media
coverage of the ADA that the administrative and judicial tide was flowing so
powerfully against ADA plaintiffs. The picture painted in the media was in fact
precisely the opposite. It portrayed a law and an administrative agency run wildly
amuck, granting windfalls to unworthy plaintiffs and forcing employers to "bend
over backwards"53 to accommodate preposterous claims. Articles and commentary
in the nation's leading newspapers bore headlines like:
The Disabilities Act's Parade of Absurdities;54
Disabilities Law Protects Bad Doctors;55 and
Disabilities Act Abused? Law's Use Sparks Debate.56
Negative media commentary crested after publication of the EEOC's
Guidance on Psychiatric Disabilities and the ADA in March 1997. 7 Designed to
help employers understand what the Act did and did not require, the Guidance
unleashed a torrent of rhetorical attacks on both the ADA and the EEOC. Leading
newspapers in major metropolitan areas ran stories and commentary with headlines
like: Late for Work: Plead Insanity;5' Protection for the Personality-Impaired;5 9 and
Gray Matter-Breaks for Mental Illness: Just What the Government Ordered.6°
51. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
Charges FY 1992-1999 (EEOC 1999), available at <http://www.eeoc.gov/statslada.html>.
52. Id.
53. I nod here to Lennard Davis, later in this volume, Bending Over Backwards: Disability, Narcissism and the
Law, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 193 (2000).
54. James Bovard, The Disabilities Act's Parade of Absurdities, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1995, at A 16.
55. Walter Olson, Disabilities Law Protects Bad Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1997, at A39.
56. Stephanie Armour, Disabilities Act Abused? Law's Use Sparks Debate, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 1998, at lB.
57. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (EEOC 1997), available at <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/psych.html>.
58. Dennis Byme, Late for Work? Plead Insanity, CHI. SuN-TimES, May 8, 1997, at 39.
59. George Will, Protection for the Personality-Impaired, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1996, at A31.
60. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Gray Matter-Breaks for Mental Illness: Just What the Government Ordered, N. Y.
TIMES, May 4, 1997, at AI (Week in Review, Sec. 4).
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Cartoonists had a field day, as this selection from the Detroit News6' exemplifies:
t ,.
The ADA's "image problem" was not confined to the print media. As Cary
LaCheen describes later in this volume,62 the Act was pilloried in television news
and sitcom programming as well. In all likelihood, many Americans'
"understanding" of the ADA was shaped by a Simpsons episode entitled "King
Sized Homer," in which Bart Simpson's father attempted to eat himself to a weight
of 300 pounds, so that he could be diagnosed as "hyper-obese" and use the ADA to
avoid having to participate in an otherwise mandatory workplace exercise program.
Others may have learned about the law while watching a King of the Hill episode
entitled "Junkie Business," in which a drooling, near catatonic addict-employee
who spent much of the work day in a fetal position claimed protection of the ADA
to avoid being fired. His "rights" to come in late, to have the lights dimmed, and to
do little productive work are championed by a social worker, who, sporting a wrist
brace for carpal tunnel syndrome, refers to himself and his addict-client as the
"truly disabled." One by one, other employees at the business follow suit, until no
one but the beleaguered manager is doing any work. Everyone else is claiming to
61. Larry Wright, DETorr NEWS, 1997.
62. Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung, and Juggler's Dispair, The Portrayal of the Americans
with Disabilities Act on Television, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223 (2000).
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be "disabled" and, under the sheltering wings of the ADA, immune from discipline
or discharge.
Predictions that a backlash against the ADA might occur emerged as early as
1994. Perhaps the first such concern was voiced that year by Joseph Shapiro. In an
article that troubled many ADA activists, Shapiro cautioned that because passage
of the ADA was not preceded by a well-publicized social movement, the Act, along
with the people who mobilized or enforced it, might be particularly vulnerable to
misinterpretation, hostility, resentment, and other backlash effects.63 Shapiro
reiterated these concerns the same year in his landmark book about the modem
American disability rights movement.6'
Additional predictions of backlash, or claims that a backlash against the ADA
was already underway, followed in the law review literature. The first surfaced in
1995, in an article by Professor Deborah Calloway on the potential implications of
new structural theories of equality.65  Calloway's prediction was soon followed by
claims that a judicial and media backlash against the ADA was in fact already
underway.6 By the time the American Bar Association study was released, many
within the disability advocacy community were speaking openly of a growing
backlash against the ADA.
Most of us involved in this or other social justice struggles have at one time or
another referred to resistance to civil rights initiatives as a "backlash." Whether
working to advance the rights of women, to win basic civil rights for lesbians and
gay men, to defend affirmative action, or to bring about the full integration of
people with disabilities into every facet of economic, political, cultural, and social
life, referring to resistance as "backlash" is, among other things, a good way to
blow off steam. Of course, it is one thing to blow off steam and quite another to
63. Joseph P. Shapiro, Disability Policy and the Media: A Stealth Civil Rights Movement Bypasses the Press
and Defies Conventional Wisdom, 22 POL'Y. STUD. J. 123 (1994).
64. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 70-73, 328
(1994) (discussing potential for backlash against disability rights advocacy).
65. Deborah A. Calloway, Dealing With Diversity: Changing Theories of Discrimination, 10 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENTARY 481, 492 ("Expansive reading of the ADA definition of disability combined with demands for
equal employment opportunity through workplace accommodation for individuals currently outside of ADA coverage
may create a backlash against the rights granted under the ADA similar to the backlash against affirmative action.").
For later references to potential ADA backlash, see, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet et al., Accommodating Vulnerabilities to
Environmental Tobacco Smoke: A Prism for Understanding the ADA, 12 J. L. & HEALTH 1, 3-4, 21 (1997-98)
(discussing the connection between an expansive definition of disability and attacks on the ADA); Christopher Aaron
Jones, Legislative Subterfuge? Failing to Insure Persons with Mental Illness Under the Mental Health Parity Act and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50 VAND. L. REV. 753, 785 (1997) (noting that by failing to define key statutory
terms and provisions with sufficient specificity, Congress gives lip service to broad social ideals, but foists key
controversial decisions and the hostility those decisions generate onto courts and administrative agencies).
66. For examples of these claims, see, e.g., Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People
with Disabilities, Illness and Parenting Responsibilities Under United States Law, YALE J. L. & FEMiNiSM 213 (1997)
("The backlash against the Americans with Disabilities Act ... has been immediate and strong."); Paul Steven Miller,
The Americans with Disabilities Act in Texas: The EEOC's Continuing Efforts in Enforcement, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 777,
779 (1997) (citing Kathi Wolfe, "Bashing the Disabled: The New Hate Crime, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1995, at 24);
Paul Steven Miller, The EEOC's Enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Sixth Circuit, 48 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 217, 218 (1998).
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think systematically about precisely what "backlash" might be, what causes it to
occur, and how it might be prevented or reckoned with if and when it emerges.
In an attempt to encourage this sort of systematic thinking, the Berkeley
Journal of Employment and Labor Law brought together a remarkable group of
disability activists and practitioners, and a distinguished group of scholars from the
fields of law, sociology, psychology, political science, economics, history, and
English literature whose work has centered on disability rights issues. Over the
course of two days in March of 1999, this group, along with over 200 students,
lawyers, and community members in attendance, collectively investigated the
following questions implicated by public, judicial, and media responses to the
ADA:
* What is "backlash?" Can it meaningfully be distinguished from other
forms of retrenchment or resistance to social change initiatives?
* Is there in fact an ongoing backlash against the ADA and related disability
rights initiatives?
* If so, how is that backlash manifesting in the media, in judicial decision
making, and in academic or other social commentary?
e Assuming some discrete backlash phenomenon exists, to what factors might
it reasonably be attributed? How can our efforts to understand this phenomenon be
informed by insights from legal studies and from other disciplines, such as
sociology, psychology, political science, economics, history, or disability studies?
And finally;
* What are the implications of public, media, and judicial responses to the
ADA for future strategies in disability advocacy and policy-making, or for strategy
formulation in social justice movements more generally?
The thirteen papers and three responsive commentaries comprising this
volume bring diverse, interdisciplinary perspectives to the investigation of these
questions.
The first three papers explore patterns of judicial response to the ADA from a
traditional legal analytical perspective. In Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the
Civil Rights Model, Matthew Diller provides a broad overview of these patterns and
suggests two partial explanations for them. First, he suggests that in interpreting
the ADA, judges are continuing to rely on an impairment rather than a civil rights
or social model of disability. The older impairment model, he posits, leads to a
highly restrictive approach to statutory coverage. Second, Diller argues that by
advancing a structural rather than merely a formal model of disability, the ADA
stands beside affirmative action on the front lines of a cultural war about the
meaning of equality in a diverse society and the legal interventions properly taken
to effectuate it.
In her contribution, Wendy Parmet6 continues the inquiry with an
examination of the "mitigating measures" controversy and shows how that
67. Wendy Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of
Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53 (2000).
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controversy has resulted in a narrowing of ADA coverage. Her investigation,
which includes a discussion of the Supreme Court's recent ADA "definition of
disability" decisions,6 reveals a consistent pattern of judicial refusal to utilize either
the Act's legislative history or the administrative regulations promulgated by the
EEOC in defining "disability" for ADA coverage purposes. She explores this
pattern's connection with the new textualist 69 school of statutory interpretation and
concludes that in focusing on the purported "plain meaning" of statutory terms,
textualist methodology necessarily enmeshes the interpreter in the same stereotypic
understandings of relevant constructs that a statute like the ADA was designed to
transform.
In The Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, Chai Feldblum traces the
breakdown of a pre-ADA consensus, developed in cases under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, about the meaning of key disability-related terms and concepts. The
breakdown, Feldblum's analysis suggests, resulted from the sudden infusion of
large numbers of big-firm, defense-side employment lawyers into a disability rights
enforcement process previously dominated by public lawyers and disability rights
lawyer/activists. This new group of private, big-firm lawyers had little prior contact
with the disability rights movement, little familiarity with the social model of
disability, and little appreciation for the ways in which key normative elements of
that model had animated the ADA. Armed with new textualist methods, Feldblum
suggests, these lawyers quickly went to work finely parsing the ADA's language
and crafting narrowing interpretations of its various terms and concepts. These
interpretations, though conceptually remote from the disability rights vision that
had guided the statute's drafters, were readily embraced by members of the federal
bench.
Professors Diller, Parmet, and Feldblum all describe a startling disconnect
between the understanding of the ADA shared by the activists and legislative aides
who drafted the statute, and the private lawyers and judges who eventually shaped
its interpretation. Insights into the various factors contributing to this phenomenon
are developed in the next set of papers, which includes contributions by political
scientist Harlan Hahn, sociologist Richard Scotch, and English literature scholar
Lennard Davis.
In Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?,
Professor Hahn argues that the crabbed judicial interpretations of the ADA
described by Diller, Parmet, and Feldblum stem from three fundamental sources: 1)
widespread judicial confusion over the relationship between impairment and
disability; 2) the failure or refusal of judges to adopt a socio-political conception of
disability; and 3) generalized resistance to the "minority group" approach to
68. These include Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999) (corrective lenses and
myopia), Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 2133 (1999) (hypertension controlled by
medication), and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. _, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (1999) (monocular vision).
69. 1 nod here to William Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990).
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disability policy issues. He proceeds to trace the enduring influence of paternalism
and covert hostility toward the disabled on judicial responses to disability
discrimination claims, and proposes a principle of "Equal Environmental
Adaptations" as a tool for slicing through attitudinal and conceptual barriers to full
implementation of the policy goals underlying the ADA.
Professor Davis continues this excavation of judicial attitudes towards people
with disabilities in his intellectually playful and engaging essay, Bending Over
Backwards: Disability, Narcissism, and the Law. Bringing Freud and Shakespeare
to bear on the reading of ADA cases as narrative texts, Davis demonstrates that
ADA plaintiffs are being portrayed in federal case law in much the same way as
they have been depicted in English literature and Freudian theory-as narcissistic,
self-concerned, and overly demanding. Davis' observations echo Harlan Hahn's
claim that popular and legal discourse on disability remains heavily freighted with
covert hostility and resentment directed toward the disabled.
Readers unfamiliar with the social model of disability will appreciate the
concise and accessible overview of the subject provided by Richard Scotch's
Models of Disability and the Response to the Americans with Disabilities Act. As
Scotch explains, under an older "impairment" or "rehabilitation" model, disability
is conceptually located within the disabled individual. Under this approach, an
impairment is seen as causing "disability" if it prevents the disabled person from
functioning effectively in the world-as-it-is. If the individual can be retrained or
cured, he or she is no longer considered "disabled." If neither retraining nor cure is
possible, social welfare benefits provide the disabled person with a subsistence
income. Under this older model, which still underlies the federal social security
disability system, a certification of disability operates as a kind of "ticket" into the
system of rehabilitation and/or support, and signals to both the disabled individual
and to members of the surrounding polity that the individual is neither expected nor
entitled to function fully in the larger socio-economic world.
The model of disability reflected in the ADA represents a fundamentally
different theoretical framework. Under the social model, disability is seen as
resulting not from impairment per se, but from an interaction between the
impairment and the surrounding structural and attitudinal environment. Under this
approach, environments, not simply impairments, cause disability.
Two consequences flow from this conceptual understanding, one implicated in
defining disability and the other in ascertaining society's proper response to it.
First, under a social approach to disability, determining whether a particular
condition is "disabling" requires an examination of the attitudinal and structural
environments in which a person functions, not merely an examination of the person
herself. Accordingly, an impairment may be "disabling" in one structural and
attitudinal environment but not in another. Second, once "disability" is no longer
located entirely within the impaired individual, but in the environment as well, the
presence of an impairment can be seen as triggering a societal obligation to change
the environment, so that disabled individual can function despite her impairment.
As the articles by Professors Hahn, Davis, and Scotch demonstrate, appreciating
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the differences between the impairment and social models of disability is central to
understanding the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The next two articles, the first by Cary LaCheen and the second by Vicki
Laden and Gregory Schwartz, examine the depiction of disability issues in the
media and trace those depictions into ADA jurisprudence and human resource
management discourse. In Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and Juggler's
Despair: The Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television,
LaCheen identifies and explores a number of curious parallels between ADA media
coverage and the treatment of disability issues in federal case law.
LaCheen's well-documented claim that television coverage of the ADA has
been overwhelmingly negative, one-sided, and substantially misleading is
profoundly important. Popular attitudes toward legal rights and obligations are
likely influenced more by people's beliefs about what legal and regulatory schemes
require, how they are enforced, and the effects of enforcement on individuals and
society than by actual legal doctrine, enforcement activities, or (to the extent they
can be accurately measured) practical effects. Popular beliefs about law are shaped
by many factors, including media coverage, through which a particular set of
scripts, symbols, and condensing themes is transmitted to the reading and viewing
public.
To the extent that a particular law or regulatory regime is politically
controversial, that controversy will be enacted in the print and broadcast media, as
positive and negative scripts, symbols, and condensing themes compete for
audience attention. The particular condensing themes that prevail in this contest
become the dominant cognitive and attitudinal frames through which people assign
meaning to the law and construe efforts to mobilize or enforce it. These "media
frames"7 organize the relevant discourse, both for the journalists who create the
coverage, and for the public, which reads, hears, or views it. Eventually, socio-
cultural dissemination of particular media representations proceeds to the point that
it becomes meaningful to refer to these representations not only as "media frames,"
but as broader "discursive frames," which influence popular attitudes towards the
law, its enforcers, and its beneficiaries.
In Psychiatric Disabilities, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the New
Workplace Violence Account, Vicki Laden and Greg Schwartz examine the impact
of one particular discursive frame on judicial and public responses to the ADA.
They identify a rhetorical construct which they refer to as the "new workplace
violence account," and explore its use in attempts to de-legitimate the ADA. Laden
and Schwartz argue that the account's depiction of the volatile, psychotic
70. This term is taken from TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING: MASS MEDIA IN THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF THE NEW LEFT (1980). Gitlin defines media frames as "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation,
and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse,
whether verbal or visual." Id. at 7. Gitlin's constmction draws on the earlier work of Erving Goffman, who in more
general terms described frames as implicit theories about the nature of reality, used heuristically to comprehend,
manage, and respond to it. See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE
10-11 (1974).
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employee, poised to explode in lethal violence, is used by media critics who claim
that the ADA has deprived employers of the ability to protect employees from a
potent workplace threat. They go on to describe a new workplace violence
prevention industry, composed of defense-side employment lawyers, security
experts, and consultants, who counsel employers on "how to identify and remove
potentially violent workers in the 'hands-tied' era of the ADA.",7' This rapidly
expanding violence prevention industry, Laden and Schwartz contend, advances
bold claims about the enormity and severity of the problem, reinforcing a key
premise of ADA critics, that the Act unreasonably subordinates public safety
interests to the "special rights" of the mentally ill. Through a close examination of
judicial decisions and defense firm training materials on the one hand, and a review
of relevant, current social science research on the other, Laden and Schwartz both
expose the flawed empirical basis undergirding claims relating to prediction of
dangerousness, and explore the implications of current scientific knowledge for
compliance with the ADA and for administrative and judicial interpretation of its
direct threat defense.
No interdisciplinary examination of an important socio-legal phenomenon
would be complete without an examination of its constituent issues and problems
from an economic perspective. The Symposium offers readers three such
treatments and a responsive commentary. First, Susan Schwochau and Peter
Blanck's The Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the
ADA Disable the Disabled? examines recent economic studies suggesting that the
ADA may actually have led to an overall decline in the employment of people with
disabilities. While conceding that disabled employment rates have not risen, and
may in fact have declined somewhat since 1990, Schwochau and Blanck argue that
existing research fails to support the claim frequently deployed by ADA opponents
that these unfavorable trends can fairly be attributed to the ADA, as opposed to
other socio-economic factors.
Michael Stein extends the inquiry in Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers
with Disabilities. He argues that stagnation in disabled employment results not
from unintended negative consequences of the ADA, but rather from a particular
"taste for discrimination" which the ADA has thus far been unable to control.
In Backlash, the Political Economy, and Structural Exclusion, Marta Russell
argues that public hostility toward the ADA is driven in large measure by the high
levels of job instability and worker displacement characterizing American labor
markets. These, she contends, breed insecurity, fear, and resentment toward
employment protections extended to members of disadvantaged groups. Russell
suggests that hostility toward identity group-based employment protections will
persist until employment at a living wage and access to health care are treated as
fundamental rights attending membership in society, rather than as incidents of
increasingly unstable employment status. The section concludes with the
Symposium commentary of economist Richard Burkhauser, who discusses selected
71. Laden & Schwartz, supra note 28, at 247.
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claims made and issues raised in the previous three accounts.
The next three papers extend the investigation to areas beyond Title I of the
ADA. Ruth Colker's ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise explores enforcement
activities under the public accommodations provisions of the ADA, which prohibit
discrimination by retail establishments, entertainment facilities, restaurants, and
professional service providers. Stephen Percy continues in Administrative
Remedies and Legal Disputes: Evidence on Key Controversies Underlying
Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act72 with an analysis of
administrative enforcement activities by the EEOC and the Department of Justice,
identifying key areas of dispute or analytical difficulty.
Professor Percy's exploration raises, at least in this reader's mind, a number of
intriguing questions about the problems associated with the use of indeterminate
legal standards in complex regulatory regimes. Both the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA incorporate standards which might reasonably be described as "complex" or
"tempering." Figuring out how to comply with these standards, which include
"reasonable accommodation," "undue hardship," even "disability" as the term is
defined in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, often requires a complex, situation-
specific balancing of under-specified factors by unsophisticated legal actors. When
one crafts laws utilizing complex tempering principles, how do they work? Do
indeterminate standards function effectively in guiding statutory compliance,
enforcement, or judicial interpretation? What strains do under-specified legal
standards place on courts and administrative agencies, whose legitimacy often
depends on perceptions that they are "applying" rather than "making" the law?
Professor Percy's investigation suggests that, even setting aside the tug-of-war
often associated with implementation of a new regulatory regime, hostility toward
the ADA may reflect, at least in part, the negative affective response generated by a
regulatory combination of normative uncertainty and potential liability.
Next, in Democratic Dilemnas: Notes on the ADA and Voting Rights of
People with Disabilities, Kay Schriner, Lisa Ochs, and Todd Shields examine the
history of de jure discrimination against people with disabilities in state and federal
voting laws. In a fascinating account, Professor Schriner and her colleagues review
the use of the disability category in American voting laws, describe its linkages to
the English Poor Law, and compare the treatment of disability and other socially
devalued status in state and federal voting rights laws and policies.
Finally, in a transcript of his oral Symposium remarks, Stanford Law
Professor Michael Wald73 explores the paradox inherent in the ADA's conception
of discrimination. This conception on the one hand requires decision making to be
tailored to each disabled person's individual characteristics and on the other hand
relies conceptually on a civil rights ideology that in other contexts has consistently
72. Stephen Percy, Administrative Remedies and Legal Disputes: Evidence on Key Controversies Underlying
Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 412 (2000).
73. Michael Wald, Comment: Moving Forward, Some Thoughts on Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
472 (2000).
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directed decision makers to disregard individual characteristics tied to group
membership. While this apparent contradiction has posed obstacles for the
disability rights cause, it is the movement's heavy reliance on law, Professor Wald
suggests, that represents its greatest problem. While law can be a useful tool, he
advises, it is often ineffective in, and may even slow, efforts to bring about social
change.
Professor Wald's commentary brings us full circle to the Symposium's
convening questions: In the specific context of disability rights, and also more
generally, what is the relationship between law and social change? When are legal
strategies relatively more effective in moving social justice movements forward,
and when relatively less so? What is the significance of backlash in this context?
Is it a meaningful construct, or merely an epithet used by social change activists to
describe the arguments and activities of their opponents? If it is a meaningful
construct, how and why does it emerge? And finally, how do these questions relate
to public, judicial, and media responses to the Americans with Disabilities Act?
In closing the Symposium, 7 4 I offer a tentative theoretical framework for
addressing these questions, and apply that framework to various observations and
insights offered by the Symposium's contributors. The central premise is simple:
to understand the role of law in effecting social change, one must consider the
relationship between formal legal rules and constructs on the one hand, and
informal social norms and institutions on the other. At its root, backlash, whether
directed against the ADA or against any other transformative legal regime, is about
this relationship. Backlash can be avoided, or addressed once it emerges, only
through careful attention to the complex processes that mediate it.
74. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 475 (2000).
